

ELENA DRAGOMIR*

**ROMANIA AND THE COMMON MARKET ARGUMENT WITHIN
THE CMEA INTEGRATION DEBATES, 1962-1963****

Formulated between 1957 and 1961, “catching up with and overtaking” the capitalist West was one of the most famous slogans of the Soviet propaganda. It argued that, in terms of production and wellbeing of people, socialism (and especially the Soviet Union) could surpass the strongest and richest capitalist countries (and especially the United States). Such an ambition, however, implicitly recognized that the capitalist countries were ahead of the socialist states.¹ By 1962, in different bloc settings, Nikita Khrushchev was openly mentioning the economic superiority of the Common Market, and, more or less directly, prompted its bloc allies to accept Western European integration as a model for the socialist bloc’s reformation. Arguing against the proposed Eastern European integration, Romania rejected the Soviet Common Market argument in strong terms.

Drawing mainly from the archive of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), this article focuses on Romania’s opposition to the Common Market argument as it was used in the early 1960s bloc debates on the reformation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The article is structured in three main parts. Setting the background for the main analysis, the first section briefly presents Eastern bloc’s attitudes towards the European Economic Community (EEC), prior to 1962. Concentrating on Romania’s perceptions, views and tactics of opposition, the next two parts focus on the Romanian-Soviet debates with regard to the Soviet Common Market argument – i.e. Khrushchev’s 1962 proposal of using Western European integration as a model for CMEA reformation and the reasons supporting his thesis. There is generally very little information on Khrushchev’s 1962 EEC-related proposal of CMEA reformation and on the reactions of his allies. Thus, although it was not possible to use evidence from the Moscow archives, this article, corroborated by findings involving studies in other Eastern European archives, will help to create a better understanding not only of the CMEA debates on integration, but also on its general stance towards the EEC.

The early 1960s witnessed a serious, although mostly secret, Romanian-Soviet controversy on the reformation of the CMEA. The USSR and the rest of the bloc prompted specialization in production, integration, common planning, supranational institutions and the enlargement of the Council’s competences, while the Romanian

* “Valahia” University of Târgoviște, Romania.

** This work was supported by a grant of Ministry of Research and Innovation, CNCS – UEFISCDI, Project number PN-III-P1-1.1-PD-2016-0184, within PNCDI III.

¹ Katalin Miklóssy, Melanie Ilic, *Introduction: Competition in state socialism*, in Katalin Miklóssy, Melanie Ilic (eds.), *Competition in Socialist Society*, London and New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 3-4.

leadership strongly opposed such proposals, which it perceived as threats to the state's national interests.² The Romanian-Soviet disagreement on this subject is, generally, well documented, with many studies published in the last decades.³ Benefiting from the opening of the archives of the RCP, the recent scholarship examined in depth Romania's reasons of opposition, its activity and relations within the Council⁴, but also Romania's perceptions of the others' intentions and its tactics and arguments of opposition.⁵ However, how the Common Market argument was used in the context of the CMEA contradictory debates on integration is a topic never before explored by historiography.

Arguing in favour of Eastern integration, in 1962-1963, Khrushchev and other bloc leaders used a long range of arguments and tactics such as the argument from authority (quoting and interpreting different Leninist and Marxist texts, party documents and declarations to support Soviet ideas and plans), the *fait accompli* tactics (presenting specialization and reformation as a done deal, already accepted by everybody), formulating accusations (those opposing integration were portrayed as anti-Leninist, anti-Marxist, autarchic, anti-Soviet, anti-internationalist, not real communists, a threat to the security interests of the Warsaw Pact members and especially of the Soviet Union etc.) or economic arguments (being contended that the CMEA's efficiency, the economic growth of the member states and the victory of socialism over capitalism could be secured through integration). Opposing CMEA specialization, Romania systematically rejected this line of reasoning, with its own arguments: the argument from authority, analogies, threats, balancing, economic arguments, postponing tactics, the sovereignty argument etc. Explored in detail in recent published studies⁶, this aspect of the integration debates will not be addressed in this article, which focuses instead on Romania's opposition to the others' EEC-related arguments used to foster CMEA integration. The Romanian leadership opposed the thesis that the Common Market was a viable model for the reformation of the CMEA by appealing to economic arguments, to the argument from authority and to the argument of analogy. Its position drew mainly from the bloc's previous stance on the EEC.

Eastern bloc attitudes towards Western integration prior to 1962

In accordance with the general Soviet hostile stance towards the West, in the early stages of the Western integration process, the USSR employed a critical and dismissive attitude toward the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the EEC or the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 'Euratom'). Ideologically, the Soviets used to argue that given the severe contradictions among the capitalist states, close collaboration among them was impossible and that eventually the three organizations

² Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions. Romania's Policy Change towards the Soviet Union, 1960-1964*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 72-127.

³ For a review of the scholarship, see *ibidem*, p. 9-16.

⁴ Liviu Țăranu, *România în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 1949-1965*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2007, p. 121-178; Dan Cătănuș, *Tot mai departe de Moscova. Politica externă a României, 1956-1965*, București, INST, 2011, p. 265-311; Brândușa Costache, *Activitatea României în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc, 1949-1974*, București, INST, 2012, p. 43-66; Andi-Mihail Băncilă, *România în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc. De la dictat economic la emancipare (1949-1964)*, București, Ars Docendi, 2015, p. 125-190.

⁵ Elena Dragomir, *Romania's Participation at the Agricultural Conference in Moscow, 2-3 February 1960*, in "Cold War History", vol. 13, no. 13, August 2013, p. 331-351; *idem*, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 72-127.

⁶ *Idem*, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 72-127.

would break down. Economically, it was observed the long-term negative impact of the discriminatory policies of the newly created organizations on the trade of the CMEA member states, while, politically, one feared that the economic integration was to lead to closer political cooperation in the West, which was seen as a threat, including military threat, to the interests of the Soviet Union and of the socialist system in general.⁷

In practical terms, the Soviets countered the creation of the Common Market with a draft treaty for all-European economic cooperation, submitted to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe a week prior to the conclusion of the EEC Treaty on 25 March 1957. Later that year, the *Kommunist*, the theoretical journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), published an article entitled *On the creation of the Common Market and of Euratom* – the so called *Seventeen Theses*.⁸ The Soviet government and scientists alike were describing the EEC and the EAEC as economic-military-political organizations, created with the support of the United States, aimed to serve American interests in Europe and German rearmament against the Soviet Union and the socialist system.⁹ Often, the EEC was portrayed as “the economic arm” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as an economic bloc that was to deepen the East-West divide and to impose discriminatory trade policies against Eastern European states.¹⁰

The *Seventeen Theses* were used to guide not only the Soviet approach to the EEC, but the struggle of the entire international communist movement against the capitalist system.¹¹ Thus, in the spirit of the time, the Soviet criticism against the Common Market was assumed by the other communist parties and communist-ruled states as well.¹² Without explicitly mentioning the Western integration process, the November 1957 Moscow *Declaration* criticized in strong terms the capitalist world and its economy which was seen as “bound to encounter deeper slumps and crises”, while the Western “relatively good economic activity” was explained through the arms drive. The *Declaration* stressed also the sharpening of the contradictions within and among the capitalist countries and the danger of the aggressive American imperialism and of the hegemonic tendencies of the capitalist and bourgeois monopolies.¹³

The EEC and the Western integration process were criticized in similar terms around the bloc. According to the Czechoslovak newspaper *Rudé Právo*, the Common Market was “a dangerous plot against peace in Europe”, while other Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Bulgarian newspapers presented the EEC as the result of an unholy

⁷ Peter van Ham, *The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity. Discord, Collaboration and Integration Since 1947*, London, Bloomsbury, 2016, p. 53- 56.

⁸ Lara Piccardo, *The European Union and Russia. Past, Present, and Future of a Difficult Relationship*, in Federiga Bindi (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union. Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 120.

⁹ Iver B. Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations*, second edition, London and New York, Routledge, 2017, p. 117-119.

¹⁰ Wolfgang Mueller, *Recognition in Return for Détente? Brezhnev, the EEC, and the Moscow Treaty with West Germany, 1970-1973*, in “Journal of Cold War Studies”, vol. 13, issue 4, 2011, p. 80.

¹¹ Lynn Miller, *The prospects for regional order through regional security*, in Richard A. Falk, Cyril E. Black (eds.), *The Future of the International Legal Order*, vol. I, *Trends and Patterns*, Princeton University Press, 1969, p. 545.

¹² Domenico Mario Nuti, *Economic Relations between the European Community and the CMEA*, Florence, European University Institute, Working Paper no. 88/360, 1988, p. 5; Karen E. Smith, *The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The case of Eastern Europe*, second edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 23.

¹³ *The 1957 Moscow Declaration, November 1957*, at The Marxist Internet Archive, <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1957declaration.htm>, accessed on 14 July 2018.

alliance between the American and the West European and especially West German monopolists, designed to strengthen the American hegemony in Europe, a favourable factor in the deepening of Europe's division and a danger to the socialist system; it was argued that the contradictions among the capitalist states would lead to the failure of the Common Market.¹⁴ Poland employed a less aggressive attitude. During the 1957 Moscow meeting of the communist and workers' parties from the socialist states, the Polish delegation (unsuccessfully) proposed a series of amendments to the project of *Declaration*, supporting a rather less critical stance against the capitalist states.¹⁵ A year after the 1956 events, Poland was still interested to improve its relations with the European capitalist states.¹⁶ In 1957 and 1958, the Polish press was expressing two main attitudes towards the Common Market: one was critical and consistent with the Soviet tone, while the other one more tolerant. From 1958 onwards, the Soviet approach became dominant, but, compared to other Eastern European countries, Poland remained more moderate in its criticism against the EEC.¹⁷

Romania, instead, employed a very unfavourable position towards the EEC and the West. In 1957, for instance, the Scientific Publishing House was releasing the Romanian version of the 1955 famous book by Ivan Kuzminov on state-monopoly capitalism¹⁸, while during the 1957 Moscow conference, the delegates of the Romanian Workers' Party (RWP) argued against the Polish moderate approach to the anti-imperialist criticism.¹⁹ In books, newspapers or periodicals, the Romanians argued that the initiator of the Western European integration was the monopolist capitalism, and especially the West German monopolies supported by the American imperialist circles; the West European integration had not only economic, but also political and military purposes; it was a tool used by the imperialists against the socialist and communist world, an addition to the NATO. Emphasizing the contradictions within the EEC countries, the Romanians usually placed the Common Market and the Euratom concepts within quotation marks, as a sign of official non-recognition.²⁰ Thus, the Romanian approach was congruous with the Soviet one and, occasionally, direct references to the 1957 *Seventeen Theses* article were made.²¹

The Romanians supported the anti-capitalist criticism and anti-EEC Soviet discourses not only domestically, but in different multilateral gatherings as well. In

¹⁴ J. F. Brown, *The Communist and the Common Market, 1957-1967: Eastern European Attitudes*, 11 July 1967, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports, HU OSA 300-8-3-15972, at http://storage.osaarchivum.org/low/23/75/23759aa8-5881-4c30-afa7-303d387f858b_1.pdf, accessed on 31 August 2018.

¹⁵ *The minutes of the Moscow Conference, 14-16 November 1957*, The National Historical Central Archives (ANIC), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party (CC of RCP), Foreign Relations, File 1/1957, 1-79; *Chivu Stoica's speech at the Plenary session of the CC of the RWP, 14 December 1957*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 57/1957, 46-80.

¹⁶ Józef Tymanowski, *Poland's foreign policy in the Years 1945-1980*, in Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska, José Luis Orella Martínez (eds.), *Poland and Spain in Contemporary World*, Madrid, SCHEDAS, 2014, p. 23-43.

¹⁷ J. F. Brown, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ I. Kuzminov, *Capitalismul monopolist de stat*, București, Editura Științifică, 1957, 372 pages.

¹⁹ *Chivu Stoica's speech at the Plenary session of the CC of the RWP, 14 December 1957*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 57/1957, 46-80.

²⁰ See, for instance, Iosif Anghel, 'Piața Comună' și 'Euratomul', București, Editura Științifică, 1958, 202 pages; "Scântea", 6 July 1957, 20 July 1957 and 5 January 1958; "Informația Bucureștilui", 8 July 1957 and 23 January 1958; "Timpuri noi", no. 11/1957 and no. 28/1957.

²¹ For instance, Iosif Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 35, 120, 124, 183, 193.

November 1960, the RWP was one of the 81 communist and workers parties that adopted the Moscow *Declaration*, which severely judged the limits of the capitalist system and indirectly criticized the EEC. This document argued that the world capitalist system was “going through an intense process of disintegration and decay” and that “its contradictions have accelerated the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism”, which “closely combines the power of the monopolies with that of the state with the aim of saving the capitalist system and increasing the profits of the imperialist bourgeoisie”. The United States – “the chief imperialist country of today” – were criticized for seeking to bring more capitalist countries under their control, “by resorting chiefly to the policy of military blocs and economic ‘aid’”; the leadership of the more developed capitalist countries were denounced for their willingness to renounce to the sovereignty of their states. Although unnamed, the Common Market was indirectly condemned, the *Declaration* emphasizing that

The problem of markets has become more acute than ever. The new inter-state organizations, which are established under the slogan of “integration”, actually lead to increased antagonisms and struggle between the imperialist countries. They are new forms of division of the world capitalist market among the biggest capitalist combines, of penetration by stronger imperialist states of the economy of their weaker partners.²²

In terms of trade, however, this severe ideological and political criticism was accompanied by Eastern European efforts of rapprochement with the West. Given the relaxation of the East-West relations, the peaceful coexistence doctrine, the new and more pragmatic approach of the Eastern bloc states regarding their trade with Western states, and a more relaxed attitude of the latter towards the former, the late 1950s and early 1960s witnessed a general rapprochement in terms of trade between the two sides of the divided Europe. Thus, on bilateral basis, the USSR, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia attempted a rapprochement with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, with the subsequent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the GATT, the EEC and individual governments of Western European states. In 1957, Romania and Poland became observers in the GATT and in 1959 the latter became the first CMEA member state associated also to the GATT.²³

The gap between the ideological propaganda (which still criticized in strong terms the capitalist states and the EEC) and the pragmatic steps taken towards improving trade relations with the West manifested in the case of Romania as well. The country’s negative attitudes towards the capitalist world and the Common Market were expressed mostly domestically or in closed bloc or camp gatherings, but in talks and negotiations with West European representatives, the Romanian delegates were emphasizing Romania’s pragmatic interest in establishing closer economic, scientific, technical, or cultural relations with the Western states.²⁴ From the early 1950s onwards, Romania had made constant efforts to normalize its commercial relations with the European capitalist states, including West Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, but, given the complex East-West interplay, such efforts had progressed rather slowly.²⁵ The efforts intensified

²² *The Moscow 1960 Declaration*, at <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/other/1960statement.htm>, accessed on 4 September 2018.

²³ M. M. Kostecki, *East-West Trade and the GATT System*, London, Macmillan Press, 1979, p. 10-11.

²⁴ Constantin Moraru, *Politica externă a României, 1958-1964*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2008, p. 58-78.

²⁵ Cezar Stanciu, *Aspecte privind relațiile economice ale RPR în anii '50*, in *AT*, no. 3-4/2005, p. 44-49.

and began to yield results towards the end of the 1950s and, in the summer of 1959, a Romanian economic delegation, headed by Alexandru Bîrlădeanu (Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Romania's representative at the CMEA), successfully visited France, Holland, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain and Switzerland, obtaining industrial machineries and equipments.²⁶ As Ion Gheorghe Maurer later recalled, Romania was interested to acquire from the West "the newest technology", which for various reasons it could not produce domestically, nor import from other CMEA states.²⁷ Manifested around the bloc, this dual attitude towards the Common Market reached new highs in 1962, when Khrushchev began to admit the superiority of the EEC and to prompt his allies to accept it as a model for the CMEA reformation.

The Common Market argument

On 10 April 1962, the Romanian leadership received a Polish 60-page long document that prompted the reformation of the CMEA. Concurrently, the Poles proposed the convening of a CMEA conference to discuss the problems raised in their draft and "to adopt the corresponding decisions".²⁸ Dated 5 March and entitled *Current problems of the development of the collaboration among the CMEA member countries*, the document suggested that the EEC could represent a model for the CMEA integration. To support this thesis, it employed economic arguments, the argument from authority, indirect threats or analogies. It was argued that integration was a very efficient economic measure and that, "without a broad economic integration within the CMEA", the member states "cannot create the conditions for the successful and efficient development of their economies" and, therefore, could not surpass capitalism. Different Soviet or Leninist texts were invoked to support the integration theory. It was implied that those opposing such theses and texts were autarchic, anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet, and a threat to the interests of the socialist system in general.

The economic success of the EEC was not only acknowledged, but also used as evidence that the integration was a beneficial process for the countries accepting it. Appealing to the Common Market analogy, it was suggested that integration was a solution for the CMEA's problems as well. Throughout the text of the Polish draft, the Common Market phrase was placed within quotation marks and often criticized, but its positive economic results were also repeatedly observed:

One cannot overlook the facts that prove the rapid fulfilment of the provisions of these [Common Market] accords. [...] Without overlooking the hardships, the obstacles and the deep contradictions that stay in the way of the full economic integration of the "Common Market"²⁹ countries and of Great Britain, one cannot under-appreciate the economic possibilities within the unification of the economic potentials of these states.

The document observed the "considerable" growing rate of production achieved in different EEC sectors and reasoned that "the successful accomplishment of the tasks of the present phase of economic development" of the CMEA states and the success of

²⁶ Interview with Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, in Lavinia Betea, *Partea lor de adevăr*, București, Compania, 2008, p. 116.

²⁷ Interview with Ion Gheorghe Maurer, in Lavinia Betea, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

²⁸ Polish letter to the Romanian leadership, 10 April 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 53/1962-1963, 146.

²⁹ Quotation marks in original.

their economic competition with the capitalist system depended “to a great extent on the progress that will be obtained through the economic integration of these [CMEA] countries”.

Western European integration was presented not only as a model of reformation, but also as a threat to the interests of the Eastern states, a threat that “had to urge” them “to establish the means for [achieving] the rapid economic unification of the socialist countries”. According to the Poles, the more dependent the CMEA states became on the trade with the West, the more vulnerable they were to the EEC’s discriminatory measures; therefore, according to the Polish proposals, the CMEA states needed, on the one hand, to improve intra-bloc cooperation and, on the other, to decrease the CMEA economic dependency on the trade with the EEC countries. The practical ways to achieve “a closer integration of the economies of the fraternal countries” were the coordination of the investment plans, the creation of supranational bodies, the establishing of an Economic and Political Council of the CMEA and the revision of the CMEA’s Statute to enlarge its competences. Concurrently, the EEC was criticized for having at its base the growing influence of the groupings of the monopolist capital and their strong domination over the governments of the respective capitalist states, for being driven by the aggressive anticommunist policy of the imperialist countries, by their interest for unjustified profits and by their fear of the consequences of the dynamic development of the socialist countries. The deep contradictions within the capitalist states and the fierce struggle between the national capitalist groups were also mentioned.³⁰

In conclusion, on the one hand, the Poles used the Common Market analogy to prove that integration was an economic efficient measure that should be therefore adopted by the CMEA as well. On the other hand, admitting the superiority of the EEC states, they argued that CMEA integration was necessary as a counter-reaction to the EEC’s policies that threatened the interests of the Eastern states and as mandatory condition to secure the victory of socialism over capitalism.

On 15 May, the Romanians received a Polish *Project of Resolution*, to be discussed and approved during the June 1962 CMEA meeting. The document argued in favour of the coordination of the economic plans of the member states, but the initial integration proposals were no longer mentioned. No reference to the Common Market was made either³¹, as that would have meant a *de facto* recognition of the EEC. Thus, the Poles would not acknowledge the EEC’s existence in an official bloc document, but seemed willing to address the Common Market as a model of CMEA reformation in secret debates and drafts.

The Romanian leadership believed that the real initiators of the integration proposals were not the Poles, but “the Soviet comrades and probably comrade Khrushchev himself”.³² According to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, through CMEA integration, one sought to solve the crisis regarding the raw materials shortage within the Eastern bloc and to counteract the (perceived) EEC-related threats. In his opinion, the other members of the bloc wanted to transform Romania into a market for the industries of the more developed CMEA states and into a cheap provider of raw materials for those states. The Romanian leaders believed, however, that integration would have infringed Romania’s

³⁰ *Current problems of the development of the collaboration among the CMEA member countries*, Warsaw, 5 March 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 53/1962-1963, 147-206.

³¹ *Polish Project of Resolution*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 130-150.

³² *Synthesis regarding the Soviet visit in Romania in June 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 39/1962, volume II, 28.

national sovereignty and independence, deepening its economic dependency on the CMEA and its political dependency on the USSR.³³ Despite such threat perceptions, the Romanians considered that it was not in Romania's interest to publically accuse the other CMEA members, and especially the USSR, of attempting to infringe Romania's interests; therefore, they decided to oppose integration by appealing to a series of ideologically and economically acceptable arguments and tactics: the sovereignty argument, the appeal to authority, postponement tactics, drawing analogies, alteration tactics, employing threats or balancing. For each argument used in the Polish texts to foster economic integration the Romanian leadership developed a counterargument or opposition tactics.³⁴ In this respect, a careful attention was paid as well to the argument involving the Common Market.

The Politburo of the CC of the RWP formulated the mandate of the Romanian delegation to the June 1962 CMEA conference in its 30-31 May meeting.³⁵ Drawing from ideological, political and economic reasons, the Romanian leadership (Gheorghiu-Dej, Alexandru Drăghici, Emil Bodnăraș, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Gheorghie Gaston Marin, Leonte Răutu, Dumitru Coliu or Ion Gheorghie Maurer) defined as well Romania's approach to the Common Market-related arguments as used by the others to support CMEA integration. The Romanians saw in the proposals on bloc reformation significant resemblances with the EEC integration and believed that the Poles and the Soviets had been influenced in this regard by the stipulations of the Treaties of Rome. When presented with integration proposals, the Romanian delegation was instructed to argue that, for economic, political and ideological reasons, the EEC could not be a model for the CMEA reformation: the EEC was an organization deeply affected by internal contradictions and therefore doomed to disappear; it expressed the domination of the big and powerful states over the weaker members; its economic success and its negative influence over the CMEA's trade were exaggerated by those supporting EEC integration as a valuable model for Eastern bloc integration; it reflected types of relations specific to capitalist and imperialist states, that could not be adopted in the socialist states.

Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that, in the future, the EEC's discriminatory policy could negatively impact the trade of the CMEA states, including Romania's, but, for the time being, a constant improvement in the East-West trade was observed. Since "the Common Market problem is not exactly simple [...] we must not be so afraid of this Market", the Romanian leader contended. In his opinion, the economic threat posed by the EEC to the CMEA was not imminent and not very significant yet. In his view, proposing CMEA integration as a reaction to the threat posed by the Western integration was a disproportionate measure. If different participants at the 1962 CMEA conference were to propose the limitation or even the breaking of the economic relations between the CMEA states and the EEC states so that the former would reduce its economic dependency on the latter and thus its vulnerability to future EEC integrative measures, then the Romanian delegates were mandated to oppose and to argue that the trade with the West was beneficial and not detrimental to the interests of the CMEA countries. The Romanian leadership criticized the "closed" character of the EEC bloc, which, it said, could not serve as an example for the CMEA reformation, because, as Gheorghiu-Dej

³³ *Minutes of the Politburo meeting on 30-31 May 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64.

³⁴ See Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 60-127.

³⁵ *Minutes of the Politburo meeting on 30-31 May 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64.

phrased it, international trade was and had to be free, any other approach being doomed to fail.

Politically, the Romanians planned to use Charles de Gaulle's position as evidence that the EEC infringed the sovereignty of its members and promoted the interests of the big and powerful states against the interests of the smaller and weaker countries; if Western integration was used as a model for the CMEA reformation, then the same results were to be reached in Eastern Europe as well, i.e. infringement of national interests, of national sovereignty and independence, control and domination of the weak and small states by the powerful and big states, the Romanian argument went.³⁶

As someone³⁷ annotated on the margins of the March 1962 Polish document, from the Romanian point of view, using the Common Market to foster CMEA integration was "an unfortunate example" that the Romanians could counter rather easily.³⁸ Thus, both sides – supporters and contesters of CMEA integration – used the Common Market analogy, but each proposed an interpretation that fitted its own interests.

From the ideological point of view, the Romanians intended to emphasize the internal contradictions within the capitalist world and to argue that the socialist and the capitalist systems were driven by difference intrinsic forces; one could not simply adopt and apply capitalist forms of organization and mechanisms into the socialist states, the Romanian reasoning went. Regarding the argument from authority, the Romanian delegates were instructed to quote from different (previous) Soviet and bloc texts critical to the Common Market, but also from texts by Marx or Lenin, that were to be interpreted to fit the Romanian views. According to Bucharest, this tactics was unimpeachable, leaving the other members of the bloc without any possibility of counter-reasoning.³⁹

The Romanian delegation to the 1962 CMEA conference⁴⁰ was mandated to oppose all pro-integration arguments, including the EEC-related ones, if such attempts were made.⁴¹ Opening the CMEA conference, however, Gomulka did no longer support the radical (March-April) proposals, favouring instead a closer economic collaboration. Zhivkov, Kádár and Khrushchev, instead, argued in favour of integration; and, in doing so, they appealed to a long range of arguments⁴², the Common Market argument included. Regarding the EEC, Gomulka reiterated in his speech the position expressed in the March draft. He observed that "in the conditions of a favourable situation", the Western integration process could continue, that being a threat to the interests of the CMEA states; in order to counter that threat, the Eastern European states had to strengthen their intra-bloc collaboration and to reduce relations with the EEC states. According to Gomulka,

The increasing economic integration of the capitalist countries entail from us to take timely counteractions, and first of all to take measures allowing the full replacement of our

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ I could not identify the author of these annotations.

³⁸ *Current problems...*, Warsaw, 5 March 1962, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 53/1962-1963, 153.

³⁹ *Minutes of the Politburo meeting on 30-31 May 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-42.

⁴⁰ Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Gheorghe Gaston Marin, and a group of experts.

⁴¹ *Protocol no. 8 of the Politburo meeting on 30-31 May 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 1-2.

⁴² For a review of the speeches of these leaders, see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 65-68.

imports from the developed capitalist states, through the planned increasing of the trade among our countries.

The Polish leader criticized the EEC along the line formulated in the March draft, but he also acknowledged the capitalist integration as a factor partly contributing to the growth of the production forces in the Common Market, suggesting that, according to the Western example, the Eastern integration could be economically efficient as well. Moreover, a closer CMEA economic collaboration was to secure the victory of socialism against capitalism, the Polish leader argued.⁴³

Zhivkov emphasized that the EEC countries “act against us in common”, while the CMEA’s members were “uncoordinated” and “do not take enough measures to counteract” the EEC’s policies. The Bulgarian leader contended that the CMEA needed to elaborate and apply common countermeasures to eliminate the damaging effects of Western integration upon the economies of the CMEA countries and that “an even closer integration of the economy of our countries” would favour the victory of socialism against capitalism.⁴⁴

Presenting Western European integration as a reaction to the strengthening of the socialist system and acknowledging the EEC economic success, Khrushchev maintained that a closer collaboration within the CMEA was a mandatory condition to secure the superiority of socialism over capitalism. On the one hand, the Soviet leader presented the EEC as a threat to the interests of the CMEA states, while Eastern European integration was depicted as a countermeasure to that threat. On the other hand, however, the EEC was described as an efficient economic organization that the CMEA could use as a model of reformation, through integration. “Despite all the existing contradictions”, Khrushchev argued, the governments of the Common Market “had partially managed to create pretty viable interstate unions” such as the ECSC and the EEC and thus to secure, although partially, the economic development of the member states in some important fields. The economic unions of Western Europe proved that, despite the deep dissensions affecting the capitalist world, the imperialists could work together, could unite their forces, could coordinate their economic policy and could take common measures to increase the efficiency of their economy. Khrushchev criticized the Common Market along the lines developed in the previous years, but he admitted its “partial” success, which was further used to foster CMEA integration:

If even the capitalists obtain certain results in the coordination of their economic activity, we, the communists, the leaders of the states with a planned economy, have, as it is said, command from god⁴⁵ to show a model of economic collaboration. We are able to oppose the united front of the forces of imperialism with a united and more coagulated front of our socialist community.

Regarding the “concrete measures” to be taken by the CMEA states, the Soviet leader argued in favour of a closer coordination of the national plans, of the creation of common enterprises, of the specialization of production between the member states, of the elaboration of a unique plan. Such measures were to secure the construction of “an

⁴³ Gomulka’s speech to the CMEA conference, 6-7 June 1962, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962, vol. II, 1-27.

⁴⁴ Zhivkov’s speech at the CMEA conference, 6-7 June 1962, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962, vol. II, 128-142.

⁴⁵ Minuscule in original.

integral world socialist system”, of a “unique economy regulated by a general plan”, of “an international, united, harmonious economic complex”. Khrushchev openly criticized the CMEA’s limited competences that made any concrete decision virtually impossible and asked for changes in this regard. Comparing the CMEA and the EEC, Khrushchev openly admitted the superiority of the latter: the Common Market members were able to coordinate their foreign trade better than the CMEA states; the merchandise produced in the West was superior to that produced in the East; “the international division of labour in the CMEA is, for now, less developed than that in the European Community”. Moreover,

Regarding the level and rate of the economic closeness, of the division of labour, of specialization and cooperation in production, we [the CMEA] are in fact behind “the economic community”⁴⁶ and the gap between the development rate of the division of labour between us and “the six” of the Western Europe does not decrease, but increases.

Using the Common Market analogy to support the CMEA integration proposal, Khrushchev argued that “the international division of labour is an objective process specific to the socialist system and to the capitalist system alike”. Concluding, he prompted its allies to agree to discuss the reformation of the CMEA, its reorganization, and the enlargement of the CMEA’s competences.⁴⁷

Taking the floor after the Soviet leader, Gheorghiu-Dej employed postponement tactics. He emphasised that Romania’s delegation was not mandated to address the CMEA integration, but assured the audience that the topic was to be carefully analyzed in Romanian party and government debates and that an official position was to be formulated in the future. The Romanian leader announced his accord with the previous speakers, but that was only a formal agreement; de facto, he opposed or altered the others’ proposals. Thus, Gheorghiu-Dej emphasised Romania’s position along the next lines: commitment to Romania’s industrialization; strict respect for the stipulations of the 1960 Moscow *Declaration*; support for the principle of the equalization of the levels of development in the CMEA member states and for the industrialization of the less developed CMEA countries; securing the multilateral development of the national economies (which meant the development of as many economic sectors as possible within each country, which contradicted the thesis of specialization); respect for the principles of mutual advantage, equality in rights, sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and independence; support for the principle of the division of labour as encompassed in the *Basic principles* document. Without openly opposing the other participants, the Romanian leader was in fact presenting Romania’s different opinion, its indirect opposition; formally, however, Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized his agreement with the previous speakers.

Regarding the Common Market argument, Gheorghiu-Dej advanced a different stance as well, arguing in favour of the improvement of the economic relations between the CMEA states and the Common Market states. The Romanian leader agreed that the dependency of the CMEA states on the trade with the EEC had to be eliminated, but, altering the others’ proposals, for him it was about the dependency regarding the essential goods necessary for the development of the economy of the CMEA states; according to the Romanian leader, the Council had in fact “to increase its commercial

⁴⁶ Quotation marks in original.

⁴⁷ Khrushchev’s speech at the June 1962 CMEA conference, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962, vol. I, 4-50.

trade with the countries of the Common Market and with all the capitalist states”, because that was in the interest of the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The Western integration was criticized along the lines defined in the Politburo meeting from 30-31 May: the growth of the industrial production within the Common Market states was not necessarily the consequence of the EEC integration; the economic results of the EEC were not that impressive; the EEC was a discriminatory economic bloc deeply troubled by internal contradiction; the Common Market threatened the interests of the communist world and of the socialist states. Formulating his stance against the Common Market, the Romanian leader often quoted from different declarations that Khrushchev himself had made in this respect in the previous years, mentioning also the May 1962 proposal regarding the convening of an international conference to discuss the creating of a world-wide trading organization outside any economic groupings and discriminations.⁴⁸ However, only a part of the Romanian criticism against the Common Market argument as formulated in the 30-31 May Politburo meeting transpired in Gheorghiu-Dej’s Moscow speech, which was formally constructed around the idea of agreeing with the others, and especially with the Soviets.

János Kádár argued in favour of the revision of the competences of the CMEA’s Secretariat, of “some forms of unification” within a series of industrial sectors and of taking “decisive measures” to increase the intra-bloc economic collaboration. Regarding the Common Market argument, the Hungarian leader agreed with the points of view expressed by Gomulka and Khrushchev and stressed that the development of the collaboration within the CMEA was a mandatory condition to secure the success of the socialist system in its peaceful competition with the capitalist one. The Western integration favoured the capitalist system and only through a closer economic cooperation could Eastern Europe “resist the Western economic integration with its aggressive character”.⁴⁹ Due to Romania’s opposition, however, in June 1962, no concrete measure towards integration was taken.⁵⁰ But the bloc integration offensive continued.

Visiting Romania on 18-25 June 1962, Khrushchev tried once more to convince the Romanian leadership to accept the necessity of the CMEA integration. Once again, he presented the Common Market as a positive example of economic organization and argued that the victory of socialism over capitalism was conditioned by accepting CMEA specialization. According to Khrushchev, while “the capitalists understand very well” how important the international division of labour was,

We, the communists, understand this very hard. The Western countries created the Common Market. What does the Common Market mean? [It means] cooperation, division [of labour], exchange of products. They realized that, without it, they will suffocate. I don’t see any [Common Market] country to suffer because of this. [Therefore] Each [CMEA] country to produce certain types of machines and then to exchange products; we [the CMEA] could produce in large series and with a lower cost price. When there will be a world common market, there will be no national frontiers as we have them now and then a cooperation and division of work will be needed. This is why I think we need to put into practice the international division of work. [...] As far as the division of labour is concerned, we can apply the same methods as the capitalists, using the advantages of the socialist system.

⁴⁸ Gheorghiu-Dej’s speech to the June 1962 CMEA conference, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 29/1962, 254-272.

⁴⁹ Kádár’s speech at the June 1962 CMEA conference, annotated by Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 33/1962, vol. II, 91-102.

⁵⁰ For a detailed presentation on Romania’s opposition during the 1962 CMEA conference, see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 65-68.

Regarding the practical measures to foster CMEA cooperation, Khrushchev once more supported the idea of creating a new CMEA body with enlarged competences, capable to make decisions with practical consequences. Postponing, the Romanian leadership promised to analyse in detail these problems and to formulate its opinion sometimes in the future.⁵¹ Spending his summer vacation in Romania, several weeks later, Mikhail Lesechko too appealed to the positive example of the Common Market, implying that the EEC was far better organized than the CMEA, and that the Eastern bloc could use it as a model of reformation. Once more, the Romanian representatives listened to the arguments of the Soviet representative and postponed their response.⁵²

The Soviet opinion on the Common Market was publically reaffirmed on 26 August in the so called *Thirty-two Theses* published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR under the title *Concerning imperialist "integration" in Western Europe (The "Common Market")*. The next day, the *Kommunist* published an article by Khrushchev, asking for structural CMEA reforms. Observing that the Western European governments had managed to create interstate organizations such as the ECSC or the EEC, the Soviet leader argued that "the world socialist system can forge ahead" only through the strengthening of the economic cooperation between the socialist countries. As quoted by Van Ham, this article⁵³ reaffirmed Khrushchev's ideas as expressed during the 1962 CMEA conference in Moscow.

Thus, in 1962, the Soviets were advancing a new approach towards the Common Market. On the one hand, they reiterated the previous bloc stance, criticizing the EEC, pointing to its contradictions and to the economic, political or military threats that it posed to the socialist countries, but, on the other hand, it acknowledged the EEC economic success and proposed it as a model of CMEA reformation. Compared with the previous period, this was an element of novelty in Moscow's approach to the Common Market. During the next months, in late 1962 and early 1963, the Soviet leader continued to publicly support the CMEA's reformation towards integration and to use Common Market-related arguments to support his thesis.⁵⁴ The same attitude was employed by the other Eastern European leaderships, but also by the bloc press.⁵⁵

The Romanians, however, were not so quick in reviewing their stance and in employing more positive attitudes towards the Common Market. They were primarily concerned with how the other bloc members intended to use the EEC analogy to foster CMEA integration. They genuinely believed that integration, whether Western or Eastern, secured the control of the big states over the territory and resources of the smaller states. In 1962, however, such threat perceptions were formulated in secret Politburo meetings⁵⁶, while in bilateral or multilateral talks, the Romanians chose to postpone giving a response to the others' integration proposals or, at most, to oppose indirectly. From 1963 onwards,

⁵¹ *Speeches, minutes, notes of talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, 18-24 June 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 39/1962, vol. II, 29, 65-72.

⁵² *Note of talks with M. A. Lesechko, 6 August 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 14/1962, 16-20.

⁵³ Peter van Ham, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁵⁴ N. S. Hrușciiov, *Probleme actuale ale dezvoltării sistemului mondial socialist*, in "Lupta de clasă", September 1962, p. 5-21; Excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU, 19 November 1962, in "Scântea", 20 November 1962.

⁵⁵ *Report regarding the positions of the fraternal parties towards the CMEA problems, 1963*; Articles on the CMEA reformation, published around the bloc in 1962-1963 and translated in Romanian, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File no. 112/1963, 15-20, 34-154, 219-222.

⁵⁶ *Minutes of the Politburo meeting, 30-31 May 1962*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 14/1962, 8-64.

though, integration was directly contested on grounds that it infringed the states' national sovereignty. In this context, the sovereignty principle became the main argument the Romanians used to counter the Common Market-related arguments of the other bloc members.

Making public Romania's different view on the Common Market

Despite Romania's opposition, the Fourth session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA, held on 16-21 February 1963 in Moscow, addressed once more the problem of integration and used once more the example of the Common Market as a viable model of CMEA reformation. This time, the East German, Hungarian, Czechoslovak or Soviet delegates proposed concrete measures of integration: a new statute for the Executive Committee of the CMEA, a common planning body and interstate unions. The proposals were accepted by all participating countries, with the exception of Romania. This time, however, the Romanian delegation opposed integration openly.⁵⁷

Addressing the Executive Committee on 20 February, Khrushchev too reasoned in favour of the integration proposals, using in this regard economic, ideological or political arguments. Regarding the Common Market analogy, the Soviet leader observed the superior results of the EEC and suggested that the CMEA should have used the Western integration as an example of reformation. According to the Soviet leader, the coordination of production in the Eastern bloc was inferior to that in the Common Market; the EEC had the necessary competences to make and implement decisions, while the CMEA did not; the Council acted, at most, as a minister of foreign trade and had very modest results. Regarding the commercial relations with the EEC states, the Soviet leader argued in favour of a coordinated CMEA policy. Thus, the Common Market integration was presented again as a model and as a cause of CMEA integration. On the one hand, it was portrayed as an efficient economic process, a viable model for the CMEA reformation, while on the other it was seen as a threat to the interests of the socialist system, a threat that could be countered through intra-bloc integration.⁵⁸

This time, however, Romania's representative, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, opposed the CMEA integration proposals openly; he argued that integration could not be accepted because it infringed the principle of national sovereignty. In response, Khrushchev agreed that CMEA reformation had to strictly respect that principle, but maintained that integration would not weaken, but strengthen, the sovereignty of the member states.⁵⁹ From that moment on, the Romanians would oppose integration on the formal ground that it infringed the principle of sovereignty. Instead of accusing the USSR of using integration as a means to control Romania's resources and economy (as they argued in secret Politburo meetings), the Romanians transformed the integration debates into an ideological dispute over the principle of sovereignty.⁶⁰

During the Politburo meeting from 26-27 February 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues analysed the 20 February speech by Khrushchev. They reached the conclusion that the Common Market treaty and rules of procedure were used in Moscow as a model

⁵⁷ For a detailed presentation of these talks see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 75-81.

⁵⁸ Bîrlădeanu's *Notes* regarding the talks from 20 February 1963, incorporated in the *Minutes of the Plenum of the CC of the RWP, 5-8 March 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 10/1963, 48-72; and in *Minutes of the Politburo meeting on 26-27 February 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 8-25, 80.

⁵⁹ For details, see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 79-81, 93-98.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 102-127.

for the CMEA reformation. Considering that integration was not in Romania's interest, the Romanian leadership formulated tactics and counter-arguments to block the others' proposals and line of reasoning, including the Common Market-related arguments. According to the Romanians' perceptions, the Common Market analogy was a "manoeuvre" used by the Soviets to impose Eastern integration, to "justify the necessity of the economic merging of the countries", as Ceaușescu put it. Leonte Răutu argued that using "the Common Market as a model" for the CMEA reformation was "profoundly wrong, not only theoretically, but also practically, because it reflects relations that are specific to imperialism in its monopolist phase, and [because] everything that happens within the Common Market is an illustration of those states of facts'. Ceaușescu openly contended that "likening" the CMEA with the Common Market "had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism". According to the Romanian leaders, the economic results of the EEC were not as spectacular as other CMEA leaders argued. Instead of taking the example of the EEC and of being "fascinated" by it, the leaders of the CMEA should have emphasized the contradictions within the EEC and the tendencies of domination that existed there, the Romanian leaders argued in their secret Politburo meeting. The Romanian leaders decided that when Common Market-related arguments were used to foster CMEA integration, Romania's representatives had to counteract with ideological, economical or political arguments along the next lines: the EEC was affected by deep internal contradictions and reflected the imperialist relations in its monopolist phase; forms of organization and principles that were specific to the capitalist West could not be transferred to the socialist states; the production growth rate in the EEC states was not explained by the integration process; the Common Market economic results were exaggerated and idealized by the other CMEA members; the organization did not respect the principle of states' sovereignty and therefore could not function as a model for the CMEA. According to the perceptions of the Romanian leaders, the main reason for which the EEC was a threat to Romania's interests derived from the fact that it was used as a model for and argument to support CMEA integration. The economic negative impact of the EEC discriminatory policy was a threat that might have occurred in the future, the Romanian leaders observed in the early 1960s, but that was a possible future danger, while the threat of imposing Eastern integration was imminent, in their view. Thus, the higher the perceived CMEA integration threat, the stronger was Romania's criticism against the Common Market.⁶¹

In March-June 1963, the Romanians and the Soviets carried secret but intense negotiations on the CMEA integration.⁶² During these talks, the Common Market argument was often addressed from opposing positions. In a letter from 30 March, addressed to the Romanian leadership, the Soviet leader was reiterating his views on the CMEA reformation. Addressing the Common Market argument, he wrote that

Cooperation is advantageous not only for the socialist countries, but for the capitalist countries, as well. It is not at random the fact that the countries of Western Europe, participating in the "Common Market" carry out the so called integration. Everybody knows that, in the conditions of capitalism, the integration – that is cooperation, union – occurs on a contradictory basis, and, still, the capitalists accept it. Why do they act like this? Because, today, when the mass production is introduced on a larger scale flow production, the competition on the basis of small scale piece by piece production becomes impossible. Those

⁶¹ *Minutes of the Politburo meeting on 26-27 February 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File 4/1963, 12, 33, 36-38, 42, 52, 61, 65-68.

⁶² For details, see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 99-127.

capitalists that organize their production like this will be outrun by those that organized flow production, large scale production. Compared with the capitalist states, our [CMEA] countries possess better specialization and cooperation possibilities, because, in our countries, the production means are property of the people.⁶³

Discussing this letter, in April 1963, Gheorghiu-Dej was reproaching to Yuri Andropov that one was afraid of the Common Market and therefore “bowing” to it. The Soviet representative responded that Moscow had addressed in its letter “the Common Market problem” not because it was afraid of it, but because, despite “the serious contradictions there”, “if we stay on the position of the competition between the two systems, we must look at things in real”.⁶⁴ To the 30 March Soviet letter, the Romanians responded on 7 June with an over 30 page long missive, which approached three fundamental problems: the CMEA integration, China’s participation in the CMEA and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Rejecting directly any integration measure, the Romanian leaders argued that Western integration disregarded the sovereignty of the states and therefore could not be treated as a model for CMEA reformation. Thus,

We consider that it is our duty to combat any tendency of idealization of the “capitalist integration”, of the Common Market. Our criticism is based on the fact that it is theoretically wrong and unconceivable in practice to transpose in socialism, in socialist international relations, forms and principles that are specific to the capitalist system, relations generated by the competition between the great monopolies.⁶⁵

On 24-25 June 1963, Khrushchev was visiting Romania in an attempt to “find an acceptable form of collaboration with regard to the cooperation issue” – an euphemism for the CMEA integration disagreement.⁶⁶ The intense bilateral talks ended with a compromise: the Soviets were to drop the CMEA integration proposals, while the Romanians, in return, were to refrain from making public their different opinions on matters such as bloc integration or Sino-Soviet dispute. With this occasion, the Common Market argument was addressed as well, each part preserving its initial position. The Romanian linked the subject to the sovereignty principle, while the Soviet delegates pointed to the superiority of the EEC and contended that only through a closer economic cooperation could socialism surpass capitalism. While the Soviets used UK’s intention to adhere to the EEC as an argument that integration was economically efficient, the Romanians appealed to France’s opposition to prove the infringement within the EEC of the principle of sovereignty. Acknowledging the Romanian criticism, Khrushchev emphasized:

I know people criticize me for having said that the European Community coordinates deeper than us. [But] This is right: the capitalists, under the influence of their interests, coordinate their production, close mines in one country and keep them open in another. You think that I’m an idiot. Don’t take me the right to express my opinion. I cannot say what you want [me to say], I say what I understand. [If] you don’t like it, you say your opinion, you have this right.⁶⁷

⁶³ Khrushchev’s *Letter to Gheorghiu-Dej, 30 March 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 18U/1963, 137-157.

⁶⁴ *Note of the talks with Yuri Andropov, 2 April 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Office, File no. 18/1963, 2-25.

⁶⁵ Gheorghiu-Dej’s *Letter to Khrushchev, 7 June 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relation, File 16U/1963, 17-41.

⁶⁶ Miller Center, *Minutes 101a of 10 June 1963*, available at http://web1.millercenter.org/kremlin/63_06_10.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2017.

⁶⁷ *Minutes of the talks between the Romanian and the Soviet delegations, 24-25 June 1963*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File 16U/1963, 42-116.

Despite the compromise reached in June 1963 in Bucharest, the Romanian leadership feared that integration proposals could be advanced once again with the occasion of the July 1963 CMEA conference. Their fears, however, were not confirmed. The other participants to the conference argued at most in favour of a closer economic collaboration within the CMEA and made no specific integration proposals.⁶⁸ The Common Market argument, the beneficial influence of the Western European integration over the economic growth of the capitalist countries or the positive example of the EEC for the CMEA reformation was no longer mentioned in this context either.⁶⁹ Still, in his speech to the July 1963 CMEA conference, Gheorghiu-Dej criticized the Common Market with economic and ideological arguments, along the previous Romanian line. No reference to previous Romanian-Soviet EEC-related disagreements was made though.⁷⁰

Publically, Romania continued to employ this position towards the EEC in newspapers, periodicals or books, in published speeches or party declarations. In late 1963, for instance, in a famous article by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the Common Market was criticized as the expression of the policy of the capitalist monopolies, a form of domination by the powerful imperialist states over the weaker ones, a weapon of the capitalists against the interests of the working people, a node of inter-imperialist contradictions. The Western integration process was not irreversible, the article continued, and the working class and the communist parties from the European capitalist states were called to fight against it.⁷¹ Several months later, the April 1964 RWP's *Declaration* briefly mentioned the contradictions within the EEC and the fact that it infringed the sovereignty of the member states.⁷²

Despite this criticism, Romania continued the efforts to improve its relations with the capitalist states. For example, in 1965-1966 Romania and France concluded no less than 15 financial, commercial, technical, cultural, transport or scientific accords. Between 1960 and 1965, Romania concluded nine accords with Great Britain, dealing with commercial, cultural, scientific or technical relations, while by 1967, when diplomatic relations were established between Romania and West Germany, Bucharest and Bonn concluded 23 accords in different fields. Between 1958 and 1964, the share of the imports from the capitalist states in Romania's overall trade increased from 21.5% to 39.9%, while its exports to capitalist states increased from 24.1% to 33.8%.⁷³

In the early 1960s, Romania's critical discourse on the EEC did not target audiences in the capitalist states, but audiences in the socialist ones. Initially, it was meant to provide its allies with assurances that Romania was not a weak link in their system or a threat to their interests, but later, as the Common Market analogy became more and more used to foster CMEA integration, Romania's anti-EEC stance became a tool (among others) of blocking proposed Eastern integration.

Prior to 1962, the Common Market was constantly and severely criticized in the Eastern bloc, but afterwards a new approach seemed to take form, with Khrushchev

⁶⁸ For details, see Elena Dragomir, *Cold War Perceptions...*, p. 123-127.

⁶⁹ *Speeches* by Piotr Jaroszewicz and W. Gomułka 24 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 24/1963, vol. I, 12-20, 60-63; *Speech* by Khrushchev and Novotný, 25 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 25/1963, vol. I, 126-150, 164-180.

⁷⁰ Gheorghiu-Dej's *Speech*, 25 July 1963, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign Relations, File 24/1963, vol. I, 79-97.

⁷¹ Ion Gheorghe Maurer, *Temelia de neclintit a unității mișcării comuniste internaționale*, in "Probleme ale păcii și socialismului", no. 11 (63), November 1963, 11-22; in "Scânteia", 4 November 1963.

⁷² *The RWP's April 1964 Declaration*, in "Scânteia", 26 April 1964.

⁷³ Gheorghe Ciobanu, *Relațiile internaționale ale României între anii 1948 și 1964*, Iași, Junimea, 2006, p. 97-100.

arguing that Western integration could function as a model for CMEA reformation. This new Soviet bloc stance towards the EEC was abandoned in 1963. While scholars occasionally explain this fact through de Gaulle's veto against UK's accession⁷⁴, this article pointed to the role that Romania had in blocking Khrushchev's EEC-related bloc proposal. In the early 1960s, Romania opposed not only the thesis that the EEC could be a model of CMEA reformation, but also the proposal of a common coordinated commercial CMEA policy towards the EEC states, arguing instead for increased relations between the CMEA and the EEC countries on bilateral bases.⁷⁵ Romania's position towards the CMEA policy on the EEC is, however, a topic for another article.

ROMANIA AND THE COMMON MARKET ARGUMENT
WITHIN THE CMEA INTEGRATION DEBATES, 1962-1963
(Summary)

Keywords: CMEA integration, early 1960s, Common Market argument, Romania, Soviet Union.

In 1962, in different bloc settings, Nikita Khrushchev was openly mentioning the economic accomplishments and superiority of the Common Market, and, more or less directly, prompted its bloc allies to accept Western European integration as a model for the socialist bloc's reformation. Arguing against the proposed integration of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Romania rejected the Soviet Common Market argument in strong terms. Drawing mainly from the archive of the Romanian Communist Party, this article focuses on Romania's opposition to the Common Market argument as it was used in the early 1960s bloc debates on the reformation of the CMEA. There is generally very little information on Khrushchev's 1962 Common Market-related proposal of CMEA reformation and on the reactions of his allies. Thus, corroborated by findings involving studies in other Eastern European archives, this article will help to create a better understanding of the CMEA debates on integration and will shed additional light on its general stance towards the European Economic Community.

⁷⁴ Wolfgang Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁷⁵ For instance, *Report regarding the 12th session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA, 21-24 April 1964*, ANIC, CC of RCP, Foreign relations, File no. 94/1964, 1-16.